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AMERICAN INDIANS ANbTHE BICENTENNIAL

DONALD L. PARMAN

THE fate of the American Indian during the past fifteen years
represents complex changes in federal policies, a continued shift of
population from reservations to urban areas; and drastic alterations
in how Indians perceive themselves and how the general public
views them. Taken together, Indian affairs have undergone a revolution that is perhaps the most significant since the start of the
reservation system in the nineteenth century.
'
To a large degree the Indians' changed image can' be attributed
to their fears of the forced termination and relocation poliCies of the
Eisenhower administration. As D'Arcy McNickle aptly suggests,
most Indians see their reservations and historic treaties as symbolic
of their continuation as a distinct people. The withdrawal of
federal commitments during the 1950S threatened their land base,
their special legal status, and, indeed, their survival as Indians. r
The disastrous results of tenilination::imong the Klamaths and
Menominees, two of the wealthiest tribes, bred anxieties among
unterminatedtribes which still linger. '
If the Kennedy administration achieved nothing else, it at least
reduced the Indians' fears about termination, and it marked a shift
toward a policy of self-determination and, respeCt for the Indian
heritage. Secretary of Interior StewartL Udall in 1961 dispatched
a task force through Indian country to investigate conditionS' and
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opinions. The group's report in July criticized termination without
openly disavowing it. The members recommended that Indians use
their statutory power to review Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
budgets and to assume greater control over reservation matters. The
task force also advocated increased development of economic and
natural resources on reservations, especially the attraction of industrial firms. A second task force sponsored by the Fund for the
Republic surveyed reservations at about the same time and reached
similar conclusions. 2
The start of the Kennedy administration also witnessed the first
evidence of a new militancy among younger Indians. At a meeting
at the University of Chicago in the summer of 196 I, some five
hundred delegates from the West and Alaska gathered for a week
of heated debate which produced a significant document, "A
Declaration of Indian Purpose."3 The sentiments expressed were
perhaps less important than the fact that Indians of various ages,
tribes, educational and economic levels, and degrees of acculturation could agree on this or any set of beliefs.
Soon after the Chicago meeting the more youthful and aggressive participants formed the National Indian Youth Council
(NIYC). Obviously inspired by the civil rights movement, NIYC
leaders were "of radical persuasion," and they identified with the
more traditional and impoverished elements of the Indian population. Although bitterly critical of the recent termination and relocation policies of the BIA, their chief focus of discontent appeared to be on the National Congress of American Indians and on
tribal leadership, particularly among the Five Civilized Tribes.
The National Congress and Oklahoma leaders, according to the
NIYC, did not represent "real" Indians but stood for the wealthier
and more acculturated. Such leaders might have a blood claim as
Indians, but they were psychologically white. Moreover, existing
leadership exerted a right wing influence which negated potential
cooperation between Indians and the civil rights movement. This,
in. tum, thwarted the activists' hopes of making Indian problems
known to the general public. 4
The NIYC, loosely operated through Indian clubs on western
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campuses, issued a newspaper for students called ABC: Americans
hefore Columhus, and tried to stimulate young Indians into taking
a more activist stance. NIYC publicity concentrated on such
themes as the necessity for an Indian revolution, pan-Indianism,
and retention of Indian identity. A charismatic Ponca from Oklahoma named Clyde Warrior became the chief prophet of the
movement. A complex personality, Warrior had once debated
whether to fight in Vietnam or join the civil rights movement and
had ended up spending a summer with the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in Mississippi. A sarcastic
humorist, Warrior spiced his speeches with the hip rhetoric of
militant blacks, denouncing not· only whites as racists, fascists,
colonialists, and reactionaries, but also classifying some Indians as
well as Uncle Tomahawks or Apples. 5
Before his premature death, Warrior resigned from the govern~
inK board of the NIYC because so many young Indians were
getting "sucked into the system." His complaint doubtlessly reflected NIYC members' participation in sweeping administrative
changes taking place on reservations in the mid-I 96os. Traditionally all federal programs for Indians, except for the Indian Health
Service, had been controlled by the BIA. During the War on
Poverty, however, many new agencies to combat Indian destitution
began direct operations on reservations including the Job Corps;
Head Start,. Upward Bound, and VISTA. More importantly, the
Community Action Program permitted tribaLgovernments to obtain
grants for technical services from the Office of Economic Oppor~
tunity and to administer them without BrA direction. 6 Even private
Indian organizations received federal grants for projects.
The impact of self-determination and new reservation programs
obviously needs additional investigation before any final assessments can be reached, but several important effects already are
clear. Certainly the BIAfound itself relatively weakened by the
new programs, and reservation superintendents, rather than directors of federal efforts,. assumed the role of ambassadors between
tribal governments "and outside agencies. 7 It would appear ·that
existing tribal leaders sometimes found themselve.s undercut by
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War on Poverty agencies. On larger reservations, councils usually
formed tribal authorities to coordinate the new programs only to
find that War on Poverty administrators sometimes operated at
odds with existing tribal leadership. On the Navajo reservation, for
example, a young tribal chairman named Raymond Nakai had
won· the election in 1962 primarily on his promise to "kick the
old bastards out." The chainnan later enticed Peter McDonald, a
Navajo project engineer at Hughes Aircraft Company, to leave his
well~paid job and to return to the reservation to head the Office of
Navajo Economic Opportunity (ONEO). Once in his new post,
McDonald used his endless appearances at local chapter meetings
on behalf of ONEO to defeat Nakai in 1970. In the meantime,
Nakai had tried toremove from the reservation a white lawyer who
headed DNA, a poverty agency which offered legal services to
Navajos. A federal court decision held that Nakai had no legal
power to ban the lawyer from the reservation. 8 Even when tribal
officials controlled the War on Poverty agencies, they found themselves under attack for misappropriation of funds, payoffs from
white contractors, and various other charges.
Several other developments during the Johnson administration
evidenced a growing public awareness of Indians' woes. In 1966
Johnson named Robert Bennett as the first undisputed Indian to
head the BIA since Ely S. Parker during Grant's administration.
Federal departments with responsibilities on reservations began to
hire Indian administrators and to establish Indian positions in
WashIngton. In March 1968 Johnson created the National
Council on Indian Opportunity (NCIO) under supervision of the
office of the Vice-President. Composed of seven important officials,
eight Indian representatives, and a small professional staff, the
NCIO was designed to coordinate the War on Poverty programs
and to insure that Indians shared fairly in federal expenditures. 9
Significantly, Johnson announced formation of the NCIO in a
special message to Congress. This was the first time that a special
message had dealt solely with Indian affairs. These changes, however, were weakened by Johnson's announcement of his retirement
three weeks later.
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Richard· Nixon's campaign in 1968 showed a surprising sensi~
tivity to Indians' fears of a Republican revival of termination -and
relocation. In a message to the National Congress of American
Indians (NCAI), Nixon strongly denied any' intention of .overturning self-determination or reverting to Eisenhower's poliCies.
AsPresident"elect, he commissioned historian Alvin M. Josephy,
Jr., to conduct a study of past and present policies in order to
suggest new reforms;10
.
Once in office, the Nixon officials moved somewhat slowly in
implementing the campaign promises. In the summer of 1969 the
President appointed Louis R. Bruce, a Sioux-Mohawk, as Indian
commissioner. Bruce's qualific::ttions - were promising. although
uriusual. A New York advertising executive and long-standing
Republican, he had been critical of forced termination and relocation. His lack of governmental background and his promise to
shake up the BIA created support for his appointment. Nixon not
only met his own campaign promises to retain the NCIO,but he
greatly enhanced the agency's power. Previously the NCIO had
operated with-funds and personnel borrowed from the BIA, but the
administration: secured congressional. authorization and separate
funding by early . I 970. - The new NCIO executive director,
Robert Robertson, enjoyed considerable access to the White House.
Robertson report~d to C. D. Ward, an advisor to Spiro Agnew, arid
Ward worked through Bradley Patterson..Pattersqn was an assistant
to Leonard Garment, one of Nixon's advisors for· domestic affairs
and widely touted as the administration's "houseliberal."ll The climax to these promisingdevelopments occurred when the
President presented his special message on Indian affairs to Congress on July 8, 1970. The message largely had been written by
young Indian -staffers of the N CI 0 and redrafted after suggestions
by Bruce and various Indian employees. 12 Briefly, Nixon asked
Congress to repeal the termination laws, requested legislation to
permit tribes to act as contractors for services currently provided by
theBIA and HEW, called for Indian control over reservation
schools, recommended the creation of an Indian trust counsel au'-:thority to represent tribes in disputes involving natural resources,
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and asked for the authorization of a new assistant secretary of interior to represent Indians at a higher level of government. Nixon
also requested additional money for Indian health, education,
urban centers, and the BIA revolving loan fund. IS This message
and the other changes elated many Indians who anticipated that
they now could bypass BIA red tape and obtain sympathetic action
at higher levels of government.
The widespread public enthusiasm for the message, however,
might have been chastened by a more careful assessment. While
Nixon promised to meet the traditional trust responsibilities imposed by treaties and statutes, he did not propose an expansion of
these obligations to the growing urban Indian population, estimated
at between 40 to 50 percent of all Indians. Tribesmen who left
their reservations would be served by the regular federal agencies
such as HEW, HUD, Labor, and Commerce. 14 Somewhat similarly, the administration wanted to work only through duly constituted Indian tribal leaders, and it rejected cooperation with dissident leaders and groupS.15 Finally, the important items in Nixon's
message were dependent on congressional authorization. For example, when the BlA attempted to institute contracting, citing the
Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834 and other such obscure legal
grounds, Wayne Aspinall of Colorado, powerful chairman of the
Hous~ Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, rejected both contracting
and the legal argument for it. 16 According to Nixon spokesmen,
they would have encountered even stronger opposition had they
tried to expand trust services to urban Indians. 17
By this time the militancy of young Indians had increase-d immeasurably from Clyde Warrior's heyday. Their skepticism was
aroused originally by Walter Hickel, the new secretary of interior,
who seemed to vacillate from support for Indian reforms to criticisms that the government overprotected Native Americans. Activists appeared in force at the 1969 NCAI convention at Albuquerque to express their displeasure with Hickel who was to attend. 18
The following December an activist group seized Alcatraz Island
in San Francisco Bay, claiming that the Sioux Treaty of 1868 permitted Indians to occupy unused public lands. The occupiers de-
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manded,that the government build centers for art, education, ecology, religion, history, and culture. Several points concerning the
Alcatraz occupation are particularly significant. The public's reaction, both local and national, was overwhelmingly favorable.' The
public seized upon the idea that the most famous and" notorious
federal prison might be used to benefit this deprived minority.19
Not only did the Nixon administration seem aware of this public
reaction, but officials quickly agreed to negotiate with the Alcatraz
group in hope that a setclementwould serve as a symbol of good
faith between themselves and Indians everywhere. Above all else,
they wanted to avoid any public outcry against violence.
Despite the administration's willingness to negotiate, its own
legalistic outlook combined with problems among the Indians
themselves thwarted a solution. The early bargaining sessions
headed by Robert Robertson of the NCIO revealed severe dissensions and a high turnover rate among the occupiers. 20 Frustrated
by the Indians' insistence that agreements must meet the approval
of., all, Robertson encouraged the organization of the Bay' Area
Native American Council (BANAC), which included some representatives from Alcatraz but primarily was drawn from Indians
from greater San Francisco. Robertson obviously hoped that concessions on urban services to BANAC would force the Alcatraz
group to relent. 21 After a satisfactory arrangement with BANAC,
however, Robertson learned that the Alcatraz Indians still refused
to leave the island. By May 1970 both sides had developed their
own nonnegotiable demands. The Indians rejected a temporary
and symbolic withdrawal, and the administration refused to turn
over final title to the island. The negotiations broke off by 'mid1970 when the Alcatraz leaders refused the administration's final
offer of an open air park operated by the National Park Service but
devoted to Iridian themes and staffed by Indian employees. 22 In
June 1971 when public interest had diminished, the administration quietly removed the last Indians from Alcatraz.23
In the meantime Nixon officials sought to utilize the return of
the ownership of Blue Lake to Taos Pueblo as a symbol of their
interest in reform. Although Blue Lake lacked the name identifica-
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tion of Alcatraz, the issue involved was, highly meaningful for
Indians. The T aosefios had' used the forty-eight-thousand-acre
tract of lake and timberlandfor centuries to conduct their religious
ceremonies. They had accepted incorporation of Blue Lake Into
Carson National Forest in 1906 as, a means of protecting it from
white encroachment. Later, however, the ForestService embittered
the Taosefios by opening Blue Lake to white'tourists, fishermen;
and hikers. Viewing the visitors and their litter as a religious
desecration, Governor Severino Martinez appealed to the Kennedy
administration for the return of Blue Lake, but in a nasty interde:"
partmerital squabble the Department of Agriculture refused to
release the land. Taos won ,a cash settlement for Blue Lake from
the Indian Claims Commission in '1965, but Martinez rejected the
funds and demanded a return of the land, itself. The necessary
legislation consistently was blocked by New Mexico politidans;24
Nixon officials unquestionably saw the Blue Lake issue as
much more compatible with their philosophy than the Alcatrai
situation; In this instance they were dealing with reservation
Indians, legitimate tribal authorities, and a misuse of the government's trust responsibilities. After Nixon strongly urged the return
of Blue Lake to the Pueblos in his special message, theadministra:"
tion mobilized to pass the necessary legislation. Agnew's teenage
daughter visited Taos in the summer of 1970 as a gesture of support.' 'Those aware of the informal but effective veto over Indian
matters exercised by western congressmen must have been astonishedwhen the administration overrode New Mexico Senator
Clinton Anderson's opposition to returning Blue Lake. Anderson;
incidentally, had allegedly threatened to work against Nixon's
attempt to fund the Anti-Ballistic Missile system if the Blue Lake
legislation passed. The return of Blue Lake to the Pueblos and of
lands to the Yakimas, the settlement of Alaska land claims, and a
doubled ,BIA appropriation also were endorsed willingly by the
administration because these measures corresponded with its
philosophy 6f Indian affairs.25
Unfortunately, the government's sU,ccesses did not avert a serious
division within the BIA which developed in 1971. Bruce's Braves,
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a dozen or so young activists appointed by the: commissioner to
revamp the BIA, shared little of the administration's legalistic and
inhibited attitudes toward trust responsibilities.' Instead; they demanded that the government initiate contracting with tribes, show
greater protection for Indian land and water rights, and give increaSed employment preference in BIA posts. without worrying
about legal ramifications: Their critiCism was aimed at Wilma L
Victor, a Choctaw educator and special assistant on Indian Affairs
to the secretary of the interior, and at John O.Crow:, a quarterblood Cherokee and career BIA administrator who served as deputy
~ominissjorier.26 .According· to the Braves, Crow constantly op.:
structed their attempts to restructure the organization and functions
of the BIA. For his part, Crow claimed that he was merely "trying
to bring a bit ofmanagerial order to the bureau" and to rebuild
morale. 27 The militants retorted that Crow was one~quarter Cher~
oke~and three-quarters bureaucrat. A thirdtarget6f the Braves was
Harrison Loesch, an: outspoken Colorado lawyer who, acted as
assistant secretary of interior for 'publiclandmanagement,28 As
Bruce's immediate' superior, .Loesch wielded a:, conservative' veto
over BIAactivities:
'
By this time the ,Nixon administration's. chary attitude toward
extending special services to urban Iodians also had provokedcom~
plaints from LaDonna, Harris, a part-Comanche and. wife' of
Senator Fred A. Harris of Oklahoma; An original appointee to the
NCIO,Mrs. Harrishad conducted public hearings on Indian proble~s in five cities in 1968 and 1969. She strongly disapproved·.of
the administration's policy that urban Indians tnustrely, on the
same federal agencies as the' general public. She contended that
inany Indians were being rebuffed by welfare workers and· being
told that they .must depend on the BIA. While Mrs. Harris admitted that the administration;s position on urban Indians might
be logical, she maintained that "right and reality are not always
compatible" and that Indians deserved special help in their difIicult adjustment to urban life. To further her cause, she founded
the Americans for Indian Opportunity?9 As an active reformer and
Indian leader; wifeo£. an important political figure, anq vocal
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critic, Mrs. Harris was viewed with a mixture of fear and amusement among the Department of Interior leaders.
Even the normally conse~ative National Congress of American
Indians had become a militant group by this time. Members at the
1971 convention elected Leon Cook as president. Cook had been
one of Bruce's Braves before his resignation, and he viewed the
Nixon policies as a disguised form of termination. His presidepcy
of NCAI saw the organization attempt to form coalitions with
various activist groups in order to pressure the administration. 30
Faced with more vocal criticisms, the Nixon officials responded
by strengthening their ties with reservation leaders. The administration virtually guided the formation of the National Tribal
Chairmen's Association (NTCA) in 1971. 31 Quite obviously, the
administration sought to tap the support of the generally conservative tribal leaders and to create the impression that they alone were
valid Indian spokesmen. The facts that the NTCA shared offices
with the NCIO and that the government paid members' expenses
to conventions indicated that the new organization had replaced
the National Congress as the group with which the administration
would consult on policy matters. Predictably, the preferences
shown to NTCA aroused much hostility among other Indian
groups.
The Nixon officials' problems with urban Indians climaxed
with the emergence of the American Indian Movement (AIM)
and its dominant role in the occupation of the BIA building in
November 1972. Dennis Banks and George Mitchell, two Chippewas, had founded the organization in 1968 to help Indians from
upper Midwest reservations who lived in a Minneapolis ghetto
nicknamed "the reservation."32 The parallels between AIM and
the Black Panthers were striking. Like the Panthers, AIM's
original. target was the indiscriminate arrests by the Minneapolis
police. By instituting "red patrols" to take drunken Indians home
and break up fights, AIM claimed that no police arrests had been
made in "the reservation" for twenty-two consecutive weekends.
Doubtless inspired by aggressive blacks' confrontation tactics, AIM
leaders evidenced little patience in merely requesting help from
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local federal agencies. Clyde Bellecourt, a young Chippewa who
had spent nearly one-half his life in prison, appeared at the NCIO
hearing in Minneapolis in 1969 and stated that Indians "have to
take the same avenues in our Indian way that the blackcommtinity
has taken." He added that his people "should show force [and]
show this to the Office of Economic Opportunity."33
Militant demonstrations by AIM hadbecome commonplace before the "Trail of Broken Treaties." Included were the seizure of
May~ower II and the occupation of Mount Rushmore. Dennis
Banks and several AIM leaders had attended a· government conferenceon urban Indian problems at the Airlie House at Warrenton, Virginia, in December 1970. Not only did the militants take
over the discussion sessions, but after a dispute with. the management, they vandalized the plush conference center and stole cash,
liquor, and food to the tune of $25,000. 34 The Nixon administration played down the episode, but in September I 971 Russ~ll
Means and others AIM figures visited Washington to protest
against the. BIA. With television cameras preceding them; Means's
group occupied the BIA information office and unsuccessfully tried
to place Crow and Victor under citizen's arrests. Two mOnths later,
Means and Banks led a mass demonstration at Gordon, Nebraska,
against the recent murder of a Sioux. Part ~f the protestors afterward stopped at Wounded Knee, South Dakota, roughed up the
trading post owners, and "liberated" a valuable collection of Indian
relics. 31i
While the episode at Gordon aroused considerable Indian support, AIM's prestige slipped soon afterward when it entered a controversy at the Cass Lake Reservation, and local leaders demanded
that AIM ·withdraw.. The organization seemed ·on the verge of
dissolution when several representatives attended the Rosebud Sun
Dance in the late summer of 1972. AIM and local Sioux figures at
the dance decided to plan a protest caravan to Washington on the
eve of the November elections. The final plans were set at a conference in Denver in late September and early October. Eight organizations were to participate in the ."Trail of Broken Treaties."
According to publicity releases, the caravan would expel all who
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engaged in violence and civil disorder. The protestors wanted only
topublicizeIndian woes, negotiate peacefully with federal officials,
and stage religious ceremonies. 36
.
Questions about Iailure to provide adequate living accommodations for the caravan and about the occupation of the BIAbuilding
on November 2 as a premeditated or a spur-of-the-moment affair
became secondary. The conRietnow centered round a list of twenty
demands which AIM leaders presented to the administration; they
refused to leave the bureau until Nixon officials agreed to negotiate.
The list of demands,. which ran thirteen pages of single-spaced,
type, called for a thorough restructuring of federal trust responsibilities; Some items, such as the abolition of the BIA and the
establishment of an Indian agency in the Office of the President,
were fairly commonplace and moderate. The creation of a inalienable Indian land base6f I 10 million acres and the full restoration
of treaties asa means of conducting Indian affairs; however, must
have proved mind-boggling even to Nixon subordinates with elevatednotionsabout executive privilege. 37 None of the demands
could have been met without congressional approval. In short, the
administration faced a situation that violated its central philosophy
regarding trust obligations and legitimate tribal leaders, but the
Indians refused-to leave until their demands were met~ Loesch and
Interior Department· conservatives clearly wanted the occupation
ended. immediately and by force if necessary. They solicited numerous statements from the NTCA and tribal leaders denouncing
the-BIA takeOver. 38 But ]ohnEhrlichmanand his staff feared a
public reaction against a blood bath with the election impending
on November 9. 39
On November 6 the White House dispatched Leonard Garment
and Frank Carlucci to take over negotiations. Garment and Carlucci primarily dealt with Hank Adams whom they considered one
of the mor~ responsible caravan leaders. A set of agreements was
reached by the evening of November 8 which promised that the
administration would recommend nonprosecution of thoseinvolved
in the occupationind would review. the twenty demands and other
grievances. 4o Most intriguing was the distribution of $66,600 to the
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Indians in the BIA building'to defray their travel expenses home.
According to some spokesmen, the rank and file received little of
the money, and AIM used the bulk of it- to buy weapons for the
outbreakat Wounded Knee in February 1973. 41
Although the documentation for Wounded, Knee is less abun~
dant, the main issue is altogether clear. Full-blooded Sioux' had
complained since the 1930S that the tribal council on Pine Ridge
was dominated by corrupt mixed-bloods who obtained the majority
of the federal jobs and benefits and grossly discriminated against
the traditionalists. 42 Chairman Dick Wilson incensed both thetraditionalists and AIM members by using Indian police to harass
them, arid he especially offended the militants by labeling them a
bunch of misfits, renegades, and, bums who sponged off the poOrer
tribesmen. 43 An unsuccessful recent attempt to impeach Wilson
produced an alliance between the full-bloods and AIM. The main
demand of the Wounded Knee protes~ors was that the goverhment
overturn, Wilson and the existing tribal constitution' and' replace
both with a traditional tribal government based on bands and local
cc:mimunities. The official reSponse to this, both before and during
Wounded Knee, was that such interference would violate the
government's trust responsibilities and self-determinatipn, and th~
full-bloods' only recourse was to replace Wilson by eleCting some~
oneJelse. In other words, Wilson might bea corrupt chairman, but
he was a legitimate chairman;
.
Rather obviously, the protestors at Wounded Knee experienced
difficulty in conveying their, position to the public. Most nonIndians simply did not understand the intricacies of the central
•issue, and reporters afforded little help. Most newsmen questioned
whether AIM ,leaders were serious or merely seeking publiCity.
Many reporters doubted that the federal government should interfere in a tribal matter. The protestors were ,further angered by
stories based on briefings by federal officials and Wilson's colorful
denunciations' of AIM leaders. Women reporters wer~, especially
irritated by Russell Means's antifeminist pronouncements. By the;;
end of the first month, the Wounded Knee'leaders no longer were
pictured as doomed heroes fighting oppression but as urban toughs
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out for power and ego gratification. Far less than Alcatraz or even
the BIA building occupation, Wounded Knee aroused little public
sympathy and resulted in virtually no real gains. 44
In the meantime, the Nixon administration overturned much of
the machinery it had established to effect its policies. The factional
deadlock within the BIA was broken by firing Bruce and his
remaining Braves, as well as Crow, Victor, and Loesch. When the
Wounded Knee occupation erupted, neither the BIA, the NCIO,
nor White House officials entered into the negotiations, and the
Justice Department managed the affair much like a military operation. In the period afterward, AIM· spokesmen have found themselves under a series of federal suits which have preoccupied their
time or have driven them underground. Racked by Agnew's resignation and the Watergate scandal, the Nixon administration withdrew from Indian reforms.
As the United States enters its third century, Indians have forged
a new image both for themselves and for the public. Whether reservation types or urbanites,' traditionalists or acculturated, Native
Americans no longer are patient, humble, or silent. On the surface
the new image of the Indian may seem like a direct product of such
general trends of the I960s as the antiwar protests, the ecology
drive, distain for authority, and-most clearly-the civil rights
movement Yet to explain the "New Indian" solely by recent social
trends is fearfully erroneous. The contemporary Indian has been
affected by these general phenomena but only because they presented him with new tools of protest. They did not destroy his
desire to remain an Indian nor his hope that he could somehow
remind a government and a society that they have seldom understood or fulfilled their special obligations to the original Americans.
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